Redefining How to Speak  American  Issa v. School District of Lancaster, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, and Their Impact by Flores, Abigail
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 68 
Issue 3 Spring 2019 Article 6 
Redefining How to Speak "American" Issa v. School District of 
Lancaster, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, and 
Their Impact 
Abigail Flores 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abigail Flores, Redefining How to Speak "American" Issa v. School District of Lancaster, the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, and Their Impact, 68 DePaul L. Rev. (2019) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol68/iss3/6 
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 1 29-MAY-19 16:58
REDEFINING HOW TO SPEAK “AMERICAN”: ISSA V.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LANCASTER, THE EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES ACT OF 1974,
AND THEIR IMPACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has held since Brown v. Board of Education
that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.”1 While education has been held as an important
role of the government, the United States has yet to fully embrace the
decision of the Brown Court and still strives towards the ideal that
each child is entitled to an equal education. Even though this ideal is
often stated as the basis for many courts’ decisions, in practice the
United States has much to improve upon to achieve equality in educa-
tion. In particular, the education of non-native English speakers and
discrimination against these students in education has not been dis-
cussed often enough. While the United States does not formally rec-
ognize native language as a protected class, many non-native students
in the United States suffer this exact discrimination in schools across
America. Non-native English-speaking citizens have been afforded
protection by the legislature of this country because of the connection
to national origin, an equal protection classification. However, there
have been few instances in the courts which fully combat the unequal
treatment of non-English-speaking students.
In an effort to provide an equal education to all students, the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) was enacted in order
to confront unequal opportunities in the education system, including
those that are faced by non-native speakers. The EEOA states that:
No state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual
on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by . . . (f)
the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to
overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its
students in its instructional programs.2
As there has been limited discussion in the courts as to the discrimi-
nation of non-native English speakers, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
635
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peals in Issa v. School District of Lancaster3 has the unique
opportunity to become an impactful decision in helping these ne-
glected students receive their rightful education. In Issa, six refugee
students filed a preliminary injunction against the School District of
Lancaster claiming a violation of the EEOA.4 All the plaintiff-stu-
dents fit in the classification of English Language Learners (ELLs) of
Students with Limited or Interrupted Formal Education (SLIFE)5 and
were between the ages of 18 to 20.6 Because of their ages, these stu-
dents were placed in an accelerated education program to receive a
degree before they aged out of the school district at 21 years’ old.7
However, the accelerated program did not offer the same English as a
Second Language (ESL) classes as the other school in the school dis-
trict, the McCaskey High School’s8 International School, McCaskey
East (the International School).9 The plaintiff-students claimed a vio-
lation of the EEOA and asked for a preliminary injunction to allow
them to attend the International School, which had programs specifi-
cally designed for ELLs.10
To many, the Third Circuit in Issa may have simply affirmed a pre-
liminary injunction by the district court. In reality, the Third Circuit,
while using other courts’ treatment of the issue as guidance, also made
a point in showing that the actions of the school district were not suffi-
cient to be an “appropriate action to overcome language barriers”—
ultimately creating a standard which may be influential in further
treatment of this issue.11 Even though the EEOA § 1703(f) complaint
was an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit, the framework
that the Third Circuit operated under in Issa deftly follows the ex-
isting caselaw in analyzing a § 1703(f) claim and the ambiguity of what
constitutes “appropriate action.”12 Issa created an elemental test for a
§ 1703(f) violation which embodies the intention to protect students,
3. Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2017).
4. Id. at 125.
5. The court in Issa defined SLIFE as, “English language learners who are two or more years
behind their appropriate grade level, possess limited or no literacy in any language, have limited
or interrupted formal educational backgrounds, and have endured stressful experiences causing
acculturation challenges.” Id.
6. Id. at 125–26.
7. Id. at 127.
8. McCaskey High School consists of both McCaskey East and J.P. McCaskey. Id. at 127.
9. Issa, 847 F.3d at 129.
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id. at 131 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012)).
12. Id. at 131–38.
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follows the language of the EEOA, and creates an applicable standard
for future decisions.13
Part II of this Note will discuss the background elements of the de-
cision in Issa, including the background of discrimination faced by
non-native English speakers in not only the education system, but also
in regard to voting rights, jury selection procedure, and the workplace.
The history of § 1703(f) and the seminal cases that provide interpreta-
tion and discussion of § 1703(f) and interpretation of “appropriate ac-
tion” will also be discussed. Finally, a history of bilingual education
and an introduction to SLIFE in the United States will be discussed.
All of this background information is vital to understand the effect of
the discrimination on the students, the impact of the decision of the
Third Circuit, and the overall importance of § 1703(f).
Part III will discuss in detail the subject opinion of this Note, includ-
ing the elemental test provided by the court. This Part will lay out the
relevant facts, arguments, and analysis of the Third Circuit. Part IV
will analyze the opinions of the Third Circuit in Issa and will discuss
the importance of its decision, as well as the influence of earlier
caselaw on the decision. Part V will discuss how the application of Issa
provides an elemental test that could potentially provide leverage and
protection for students facing similar circumstances of discrimination
based on native language, as exemplified in Methelus v. School
Board.14
II. BACKGROUND: ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IN
ISSA V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LANCASTER
Issa is an influential decision in an area of law that has not yet been
considered by many courts. This Section will discuss important history
and provide background on the plaintiffs’ claims and the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Issa. Knowing the history of the discrimination non-
native English speakers have endured and the protections afforded to
this group in several other areas of law is crucial to understanding this
decision. Subsection A will delve into the discrimination faced in vot-
ing, education, jury service, and the workplace to help with under-
standing the EEOA and its ability to aid in the discrimination faced by
these students. In addition, it is important to understand the back-
ground of the EEOA, bilingual education, and the application of bilin-
gual education to SLIFE. Subsection B provides an analysis of the
implications of the EEOA, which is the main basis for the holding in
13. See infra Parts IV and V.
14. Methelus v. Sch. Bd., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1275 (M.D. Fl. 2017).
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Issa and the analysis of this Note. Subsection C will introduce caselaw
that is vital in understanding the application of § 1703(f) of the
EEOA. Lastly, Subsection D will discuss bilingual education and the
methods of teaching SLIFE so as to understand the intricacies of the
Lancaster School District programs.
A. History of Discrimination Faced by Non-Native English
Speakers
Although the crux of this Note’s analysis will focus on the Third
Circuit’s use of § 1703(f) of the EEOA, the history of native language
discrimination plays a large role in the context of the case. Though
native language discrimination is pervasive in society, especially in the
education context, the Third Circuit faced the issue for the first time in
Issa.
Discrimination connected to native language is prevalent in our so-
ciety as is evidenced by English-only laws and the pervasive influence
in voting, education, jury service, and employment.15 And while it is
not recognized as a protected class of discrimination, native language
is closely connected to national origin, and the United States has
taken some precautions to ensure the equal treatment of non-native
English speakers.16 Meanwhile, immigration has always been a topic
of discussion in the United States that is linked to the poor treatment
of those who speak a language other than English.17
While discrimination in other areas of our society are not discussed
in Issa, there are many parallels to the discrimination faced by the
plaintiffs. These examples and the statutes that provide protection
contribute to the understanding of the depth of the prejudice that
15. See generally Josh Hill et al., Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of
Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669 (2009).
16. Id. at 714–15.
17. Id. at 670 n.7 (“Efforts to make English the official language of the United States or to
discourage immigrants from continuing to use their native tongue have appeared periodically
throughout our history, typically coinciding with significant waves of immigration and anti-immi-
gration sentiment.”); see also Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 276–78 (1992)
(describing how traditional American cultural pluralism created “a demand for uniformity and
assimilation to some vision of American identity, assumed to be homogenous” which eventually
persuaded many states to enact legislation declaring English as the state’s official language);
Donna F. Coltharp, Comment, Speaking the Language of Exclusion: How Equal Protection and
Fundamental Rights Analyses Permit Language Discrimination, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 149, 158–64
(1996) (describing the historical resistance from English-speaking Americans toward non-En-
glish-speaking immigrants who tried to preserve their natives languages within their
communities).
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non-native English speakers face, similar to that which the plaintiff-
students in Issa endured.
1. English-Only Statutes or Official Language Statutes
To date, the United States has not established English as the official
language.18 Yet, there has long been an effort to make English the
official language of the United States, and “the debate reflects a ten-
sion between demands for assimilation and respect for cultural differ-
ences.”19 The arguments for an official language have remained
basically the same over time, and are grounded in the idea that an
official language unifies the country.20 These arguments are often re-
flected in other statutes to limit the use of native languages over En-
glish, as well as used for rationalizing discrimination against those
using their native language. Efforts to create an official language are
“tinged with racial, ethnic, and religious prejudices.”21 Although the
federal government has never adopted a language as the national lan-
guage, there are thirty-one states that “have some form of official En-
glish legislation.”22 The anti-immigration sentiment perpetuated in the
United States against different cultures and national origins fuels
much of the prejudice against other languages.23
Many amendments and statutes have been proposed on both the
federal and state levels to impose English as the official language of a
state or the country. There are three classifications of these statutes,
which attempt to define English as the official language, and each
comes with different implications: “English-only” statutes, “‘symbolic’
Official-English statutes,” and a third group that combines elements
of the other two.24 “English-only” statutes often mean First Amend-
ment implications, as they limit free speech by requiring “government
documents, meetings, and all other official actions” to be only in En-
18. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 673. R
19. Id. at 671.
20. Id. at 671; see also Carl Hulse, Senate Votes to Set English as a National Language, N.Y.
TIMES (May 19, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/19/washington/senate-votes-to-set-en-
glish-as-national-language.html (discussing that the Senate passed a bill in 2006 stating English
was “the ‘common and unifying’ language of nation.”).
21. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 671. R
22. Official English Facts, PROENGLISH, https://proenglish.org/official-english-facts/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2018).
23. See Hill et al., supra note 15, at 670–73. One such example is that during World War I R
many states tried to prohibit the teaching of foreign language, which was motivated by the anti-
German sentiment during the time. See id. at 670; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403
(1923), rev’d, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922) (reversing the rationale that convicted a teacher for
unlawfully teaching a child the German language).
24. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 673–74. R
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glish.25 Other official language statutes tend to be more “symbolic,”
barely have any legal effects, and “attempt[ ] to show a policy favoring
English.”26 The last group is a combination of the other two, which
“appear to be more than symbolic in nature, but do not go so far as to
require English be the only language of government.”27 While over
thirty states have enacted legislation of this type, Congress has never
officially made English the official language of the United States.28
Yet, there is a common misconception that the United States’ official
language is English, and the implications of these statutes and pro-
posed amendments on those who speak a different language are ex-
perienced in a breadth of society.29
2. Voting Discrimination
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is another example of a stat-
ute that protects non-native English speakers, was amended in 1975 in
order to combat discrimination faced by certain groups of people who
did not speak English.30 Under Language Assistance Provisions of this
Act, certain jurisdictions were required to provide language assistance
programs, including statewide bilingual-voter assistance in five
states.31 States have expanded upon the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act and adopted their own statutes.32
25. Id. at 673; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.12.320 (2018).
26. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 684; see, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) (amended 2016)
(“English is the official language of the State of Florida[, and t]he legislature shall have the
power to enforce this section by appropriate legislation.”).
27. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 681. See, for example, article I, section 36.01 of the Alabama R
Constitution (amended in 1990), which states:
English is the official language of the state of Alabama. The legislature shall enforce
this amendment by appropriate legislation. The legislature and officials of the state of
Alabama shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common
language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced. The legislature shall make
no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the common language of the
state of Alabama.
Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the state of Alabama shall have
standing to sue the state of Alabama to enforce this amendment, and the courts of
record of the state of Alabama shall have jurisdiction to hear cases brought to enforce
this provision. The legislature may provide reasonable and appropriate limitations on
the time and manner of suits brought under this amendment.
See also CAL CONST. art. III, § 6 (amended 2016).
28. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 687. R
29. Id. at 671.
30. Id. at 687. The language assistance provisions only apply to these four language groups:
“Alaskan Natives, American Indians, persons of Spanish heritage, and Asian Americans.” James
Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act
of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205, 223 (2007).
31. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 687. R
32. Id. at 691.
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An example of the discrimination based on native language in the
voting process was Article II, Section I of the California Constitution,
which was ultimately held unconstitutional under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Fourteenth Amendment in Castro v. State.33 Specifi-
cally, the California Constitution stated “no person who shall not be
able to read the Constitution in the English language and write his or
her name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this
State.”34 The reasoning behind the provision of the California Consti-
tution, which excluded non-English speakers, was to uphold the com-
pelling state interest to ensure that eligible voters are “capable of
informed decisions on matters submitted to the electorate.”35 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that the Spanish-speaking plaintiffs had
adequate access to materials to stay informed and furthermore, that
the provision violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection
Clause.36 The court even stated that the holding applied to “otherwise
qualified prospective voters, literate in a language other than English,
[who] are able to make a comparable demonstration of access to
sources of political information.”37 This example of discrimination
based on native language in the California Constitution is one that the
Voting Rights Act aims to remedy, much like the protections provided
to students under the EEOA.
3. Jury Service
The debate surrounding discrimination in the jury-selection process
is one with much conflict. The Supreme Court has held that a person
has a “right to a jury composed of persons selected from a fair cross
section of society.”38 The understanding of the English language by a
juror has been deemed to be important to the processes that take
place while being a member of a jury.39 To qualify as a juror, the Fed-
eral Jury Act states that:
[A] district court judge . . . shall deem any person qualified to serve
on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he . . . is unable
to read, write and understand the English language with a degree of
33. Castro v. State, 466 P.2d 244, 258 (Cal. 1970); see also Hill, supra note 15, at 691–92. R
34. Castro, 466 P.2d at 244–45.
35. Id. at 254.
36. Id. at 258.
37. Id.
38. Stephen E. Reil, Comment, Who Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for Hispanics
in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. REV. 201,
257 (2007).
39. Id.
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proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification
form [or] is unable to speak the English language.40
The debate regarding discrimination of non-native English speakers
in jury service centers around a dichotomy: what is fair to the defen-
dant versus what is fair to those selected to serve on a jury.41 Lan-
guage classifications may not be afforded the same protection as race,
but in many situations “[a]ttorneys may be striking jurors based on
race while using language as a pretext.”42 Many believe this require-
ment could potentially ruin the objective point of juries to allow a fair
cross section of the population, by excluding large portions of the pop-
ulation.43 By upholding statutes like this, native-language discrimina-
tion is reflected and perpetuated in other parts of our society.
4. Discrimination in the Workplace
Discrimination based on language and the hurdles that many non-
native English speakers face in the education context is emulated in
the language discrimination faced in the employment context. The
United States does not recognize discrimination based on language, so
there is a long history of policies that prohibit languages other than
English in the workplace.44 Some of these policies are upheld because
of the need for the employee to speak English to perform certain jobs
and the lack of protection for discrimination based on language. Be-
cause of the failure to recognize language discrimination in employ-
ment in its own right, many of these actions for discrimination in the
workplace are brought under other claims indirectly related to native-
language discrimination.45 Most often, plaintiffs assert discrimination
claims based on a theory of national-origin discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which prohibits
discrimination in the workplace.46 Title VII has “two major theories of
liability”—disparate treatment and disparate impact.47 Under Title
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012).
41. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 707–09. R
42. Id. at 709.
43. Id. at 707.
44. Id. at 714.
45. See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Atlus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006) (involving
claims of discrimination based on national origin under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and intentional discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866); see also Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving a claim of a violation of Title VII).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (1964) (stating that the protected classifications under Title VII
are race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
47. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 716 (citing Mark Colon, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and R
Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke: English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 232–33 (2002)). Disparate treatment requires a showing of inten-
tional discrimination, and disparate impact focuses on whether a “facially neutral policy has a
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VII, an employee is unlikely to prevail on a disparate treatment claim
based on the adoption of English-only policies in the workplace. Dis-
parate treatment requires a showing of discriminatory intent, but the
discriminatory intent is most often related to native language, which is
not protected.48 Disparate impact claims have become more successful
because in these cases, native language can be connected to national
origin.49 These claims require only an adverse effect on a protected
class, such as a class of similar national origin. Discrimination actions
for the workplace are “highly context specific,”50 and the difficulty in
prevailing reflects the barriers that many face when trying to combat
language discrimination in other aspects of our society.
B. Section 1703(f) of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974
Before the EEOA, many plaintiffs brought claims for bilingual edu-
cation or limited proficiency programs under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or Title VI.51 Lau v. Nichols, the seminal case in the protection
of non-native English speakers, established the elements that are codi-
fied in the EEOA.52 “The essential holding in Lau [is] that all students
must have adequate access to English-language instruction.”53 Con-
gress sought to memorialize the Lau decision by enacting § 1703(f) of
the EEOA,54 which states:
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual
on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by . . . (f)
the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to
overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its
students in its instructional programs.55
disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group.” James S. Wrona, Eradicating Sex Dis-
crimination in Education: Extending Disparate-Impact Analysis to Title IX Litigation, 21 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1994).
48. See Colon, supra note 47, at 233 (“Many commentators have pointed out that challenges R
to English-only rules using a disparate treatment theory are rare, largely because the theory’s
intent requirement is negated by the fact that English-only rules appear facially neutral; they
require that all employees speak English.”).
49. See Hill et al., supra note 15, at 717–18 (“Disparate impact claims challenging workplace R
English-only policies have been increasingly successful in recent years.”); see also Rosanna K.
McCalips, What Recent Court Cases Indicate About English-Only Rules in the Workplace: A
Critical Look at the Need for a Supreme Court Ruling on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
417, 419 (2002).
50. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 737. R
51. 4 JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 10D.01 (2018), LexisNexis.
52. See generally Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
53. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 700 (quoting Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participa- R
tion, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 759 (2006)).
54. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 702. R
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
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The EEOA is distinct from the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI,
as it does not require a showing of discriminatory intent.56
Generally, when bringing a claim for violation of § 1703(f) of the
EEOA, the plaintiff must prove that “(1) the denial of educational
opportunity on account of race, color, sex, or national origin; and (2)
the educational agency’s failure to take action to overcome language
barriers that are sufficiently severe so as to impede a student’s equal
participation in instructional programs.”57 When a court is deciding
whether the educational agencies are taking “‘appropriate action’ to
overcome language barriers” they use the three-prong analysis pro-
vided by the Fifth Circuit in Castaneda v. Pickard.58 First, the court
should evaluate the soundness of the educational theory or principle
behind the program based on the evidence in the record.59 Second, the
court should determine if the agency’s systems are designed in order
to “implement effectively the educational theory adopted by the
school.”60 Third, even if the system is based on a legitimate theory and
effectively implemented, the court must still determine that the sys-
tem produces results that actually overcome the language barriers.61
The court in Issa designed an elemental test of four factors to state a
claim under § 1703(f). These four elements are:
(1) [T]he defendant must be an educational agency, (2) the plaintiff
must face language barriers impeding her equal participation in the
defendant’s instructional programs, (3) the defendant must have
failed to take appropriate action to overcome those barriers, and (4)
the plaintiff must have been denied equal educational opportunity
on account of her race, color, sex, or national origin.62
Ultimately, the most confusing element is the third, as the EEOA has
not defined the parameters of what constitutes an “appropriate ac-
tion.”63 The “appropriate action” is not defined by the EEOA in
terms of “what is required to state a claim, what type of allegations
plaintiffs may make, or to what acts by an education agency ‘appropri-
ate action’ applies.”64 The EEOA is “flexible and allows the states to
56. Id.
57. Deerfield Hutterian Ass’n. v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D.S.D. 1979).
58. Hill et al., supra note 15, at 702; see also Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 (5th Cir. R
1981).
59. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009.
60. Id. at 1010.
61. Id.
62. Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2017).
63. Methelus v. Sch. Bd., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1275 (2017).
64. Jessica R. Berenyi, Appropriate Action, Inappropriately Defined: Amending the Equal Ed-
ucational Opportunities Act of 1974, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 657 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 11 29-MAY-19 16:58
2019] REDEFINING HOW TO SPEAK “AMERICAN” 645
create their own remedial language programs.”65 Courts look at
caselaw for guidance on this factor because of the ambiguity in the
language of the EEOA.66
C. Important Decisions in Education Discrimination
Issa may be an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit, but
other courts have approached the topic of a § 1703(f) complaint.67
This Section will discuss the main cases relating to a § 1703(f) com-
plaint and how the courts have interpreted “appropriate action.” The
guidance relating to this area of the law has been somewhat sparse. It
is important to discuss the caselaw that presents the “appropriate ac-
tion” requirement in the language of § 1703(f) and the different ele-
ments required of a complaint under § 1703(f) when analyzing the
decision of Issa.68
1. Lau v. Nichols
One of the most important decisions in understanding a § 1703(f)
complaint is Lau v. Nichols, as it embodies the intention of
§ 1703(f).69 Although this decision predated the enactment of the
EEOA, the EEOA codified the decision of Lau v. Nichols.70 In Lau,
the plaintiffs brought a complaint under the Fourteenth Amendment
for relief from “unequal educational opportunities.”71 The plaintiffs
were a group of students of Chinese ancestry who did not receive
“supplemental courses in the English language.”72 The Court noted
that under the California law, which mandates English as the language
of instruction, “there is no equality of treatment merely by providing
students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum;
for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed
from any meaningful education.”73 The Court instead chose to use
§ 601 of the Civil Rights of Act of 196474 and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare’s guidance requiring school districts
to assure that students are not denied an education based on race,
65. Id. at 656.
66. Methelus, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.
67. Issa, 847 F.3d at 131.
68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
69. See generally Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
70. Berenyi, supra note 64, at 645. R
71. Lau, 414 U.S. at 564.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 566.
74. Id.
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color, or national origin to decide the case.75 The Court further rea-
soned that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare re-
quired the federally-funded school district to take adequate steps to
correct the lack of access to educational opportunity.76 The Court ulti-
mately sided for the plaintiffs and remanded the case for relief.77 This
decision was vital in the enactment of § 1703(f) and shows the mean-
ing behind the protection intended to be granted to students.
2. Castaneda v. Pickard
The Fifth Circuit decision in Castaneda v. Pickard is just as influen-
tial as the decision in Issa. Castaneda v. Pickard created a three-prong
test to determine whether the actions taken by an educational agency
were appropriate under § 1703(f).78 The plaintiffs, a group of Mexi-
can-American children and their parents, alleged that the Raymond-
ville Independent School District (RISD) in Texas failed to
“implement adequate bilingual education to overcome the linguistic
barriers that impede the plaintiffs’ equal participation in the educa-
tional program of the district.”79 The plaintiffs brought the action
under the EEOA and other statutory provisions. The population of
the school district in question was 85% Mexican-American, yet only
had a bilingual education program through the third grade.80
The court in Castaneda analyzed the § 1703(f) claim by “adher[ing]
closely to the plain language” of the Act.81 The court stated that an
action taken by an educational agency that is not making “appropriate
efforts” is still a violation of § 1703(f) regardless of an intent to dis-
criminate because this section of the EEOA does not use words such
as “intent” and “discrimination.”82 The court further reasoned that
the intent of the enacting legislature was not to restrict the educa-
tional agencies to particular remedial measures. Instead, it intended to
allow some flexibility by authorizing state and local authorities to
choose which method was best for satisfying the statutory
obligations.83
75. Id. at 566–67.
76. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566–67; see also Polices on Elementary and Secondary School Compli-
ance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 Fed. Reg. 4956 (Mar. 18, 1968); Identifica-
tion of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg.
11,595 (July 18, 1970).
77. Lau, 414 U.S. at 569.
78. Berenyi, supra note 64, at 659–60. R
79. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 993.
81. Id. at 1007.
82. Id. at 1008.
83. Id. at 1009.
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The court then set forth a three-prong model analysis for claims
under § 1703(f) that attempted to guide this and other courts.84 First,
the court stated that an inquiry should be made “concerning the
soundness of the educational theory or principles upon which the
challenged program is based.”85 Second, the court should inquire as to
whether “the programs and practices actually used by a school system
are reasonably calculated to implement effectively the educational
theory adopted by the school.”86 Third, the court should analyze:
[I]f a school’s program, although premised on a legitimate educa-
tional theory and implemented through the use of adequate tech-
niques, fails, after being employed for a period of time sufficient to
give the plan a legitimate trial, to produce results indicating that the
language barriers confronting students are actually being overcome,
that program may, at that point, no longer constitute appropriate
action as far as that school is concerned.87
This three-prong approach was then used to analyze every factor of
the plaintiffs’ claim of an inadequate bilingual education program.88
Using these three prongs, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ alle-
gation that a program does not meet the requirements of § 1703(f)
where such a program first focuses on English language development
and then provides “intensive remedial” programming to make sure
the students catch up in other areas of their education.89 However,
when analyzing the claim that RISD employed unqualified teachers
for the bilingual education program, the court determined that “[u]ntil
deficiencies in this aspect of the program’s implementation are reme-
died, we do not think RISD can be deemed to be taking ‘appropriate
action’ to overcome the language disabilities of its students.”90 The
court also held that on remand RISD should be required to imple-
ment an adequate achievement test.91 Castaneda was essential in cre-
ating a model for how to analyze the “appropriate action” taken by an
educational agency. The test is incorporated into the analysis of many
courts, including the Issa court, and provided further protection for
students with limited English understanding.
84. Id.
85. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009.
86. Id. at 1010.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1011–12.
90. Id. at 1013.
91. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1014.
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D. SLIFE: Students with Limited or Interrupted Formal Education
Students with Limited or Interrupted Formal Education (SLIFE)
are a subset of English Language Learners (ELLs).92 The court in Issa
defined SLIFE as, “English language learners who are two or more
years behind their appropriate grade level, possess limited or no liter-
acy in any language, have limited or interrupted formal educational
backgrounds, and have endured stressful experiences causing accul-
turation challenges.”93 While this is an accurate description of SLIFE,
it is vital to look at the needs of SLIFE and their connection to bilin-
gual education to understand the implications on the decision in Issa.
The characteristics of SLIFE are that they are new to the school
system and have had little schooling in their native language.94 While
these students may have some reading and writing education in their
native language, they fall below their grade level in most educational
metrics.95 Important to note is that these students could be immigrants
or refugees who lack an understanding of the English language and
have not had access to a formal education, but it is not a requirement
of SLIFE that they be a refugee. Therefore, SLIFE also could be any
student, regardless of origin, who exhibits these characteristics and
“experienced limited or interrupted access to school.”96
The difficulty of teaching SLIFE is teaching them the English lan-
guage while also teaching grade-level subjects and maintaining an ap-
preciation for the student’s native language and culture.97 It is
generally accepted that the education should emphasize teaching the
English language, but also teach the subjects in a way that the students
can understand.98 Students should be given the opportunity to test in
their native language because “tests of content knowledge can be
skewed by a student’s developing linguistic ability to process and ex-
press academic concepts in English.”99
92. SLIFE: Students with Limited or Interrupted Formal Education, WIDA FOCUS BULL.
(WIDA Consortium, Wisconsin Ctr. for Educ. Res., Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison), May 2015, at
1, https://wida.wisc.edu/sites/default/files/resource/FocusOn-SLIFE.pdf [hereinafter WIDA FO-
CUS BULL.].
93. Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 2017).
94. See WIDA FOCUS BULL., supra note 92, at 1; see also Andrea DeCapua & Helaine W. R
Marshall, Reframing the Conversation About Students with Limited or Interrupted Formal Edu-
cation: From Achievement Gap to Cultural Dissonance, 99 NASSP BULL. 356, 357 (2015) (defin-
ing SLIFE using 4 characteristics).
95. See WIDA FOCUS BULL., supra note 92, at 1. R
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3–5.
98. Id. at 5–6.
99. Id. at 6.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 15 29-MAY-19 16:58
2019] REDEFINING HOW TO SPEAK “AMERICAN” 649
One approach to meeting the needs of SLIFE is Sheltered Instruc-
tion.100 Sheltered Instruction involves grouping students together with
“comparable English-proficiency levels” for their content courses.101
The students are therefore “‘sheltered’ in those classes from other
ELLs at higher proficiency levels and from native English speak-
ers.”102 This approach makes “subject matter concepts comprehensi-
ble while promoting the students’ English language development.”103
The advantage of this approach is that students do not lose the oppor-
tunity to learn the grade-level curriculum.104
There are also many other approaches and programming options to
aid SLIFE in their learning. An educational agency may choose to use
native language instruction, which allows the student to use their na-
tive language during class instruction.105 This method is said to help
“students process and make meaning” of the classroom teachings.106
Some agencies may choose to implement a “newcomer program,”
which is a program focused on new immigrants and their needs in
“separate, relatively self-contained educational instruction.”107 These
programs are typically implemented in a child’s education before
other traditional methods, such as ELL programs or programs that
supplement classroom instruction.108 Other programs that aid SLIFE
are peer-mentoring programs, which allow the student to become ac-
climated to the social and educational atmosphere and after-school
programs.109
Sheltered Instruction is one of the approaches used by the school
district in Issa. These different programs and methods are not dis-
cussed in the Issa decision; yet, it is important to understand that edu-
cational agencies have many options when choosing the program to
implement for their students, especially when considering the “appro-
priate action” language of § 1703(f).
100. Id. at 9.
101. Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2017).
102. Id.
103. See WIDA FOCUS BULL., supra note 92, at 9. R
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. See id.
109. WIDA FOCUS BULL., supra note 92, at 10. Other suggested programs in the University/ R
Community Organization Partnerships arena “[p]rovide support to families beyond the academ-
ics, such as ESL programs for students and/or parents, or social/family services.” Id.
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III. SUBJECT OPINION: ISSA V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LANCASTER
This Section will analyze in depth the decision of the Third Circuit
in Issa v. School District of Lancaster. The focus of the analysis of this
Note is the § 1703(f) claim under the EEOA, the Third Circuit’s treat-
ment of this claim, and its importance in further treatment of claims
under § 1703(f). While the state law claims may have importance for
the state of Pennsylvania, they are not important for the analysis of
the EEOA and the tests the court uses.110 Subsection A will relay the
facts of the case and the claims asserted by the plaintiffs. Subsection B
will set forth the elements of a preliminary injunction and describe the
Third Circuit’s analysis under this standard. Finally, Subsection C will
provide the conclusion of the court.
The complaint was originally brought by six refugee children resid-
ing in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.111 The plaintiffs asked the court to
grant a preliminary injunction allowing the plaintiffs to transfer to the
McCaskey High School International School.112 The plaintiffs brought
the claim against the School District of Lancaster under violations of
Pennsylvania law and § 1703(f) of the EEOA.113 The district court
sided with the plaintiffs and granted their preliminary injunction.114
The defendant appealed to the Third Circuit, where an EEOA
§ 1703(f) violation was addressed for the first time in this Circuit’s
history.115
110. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred “as a matter of
law in finding that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on their state law claims.” Issa v.
Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2017). Pennsylvania state law provides that a child should
not be denied the right to school based on immigrant status and that a student may attend school
until the end of the year they turn 21. Id.; see also 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1301
(West 2002); 22 PA. CODE §§ 11.11–11.12 (amended 2004). The plaintiff claimed the defendant
violated state law which states that the school district should enroll a student no later than 5
business days after application. Issa, 847 F.3d at 141. The court reasoned that there was no lan-
guage in the Public School Code that granted an individual a private cause of action. Id. The
court also determined that even if there was an implicit right of private action, the “exhaustion
of administrative remedies may be required.” Id. at 142. The appellate court remanded this ques-
tion to the district court as they believed it was erroneous to conclude the plaintiffs showed a
likelihood of success. Id. at 140. The appellate court did state that nothing in the preliminary
injunction of the district court relied on the violations of the state law. Id. at 142.
111. Issa, 847 F.3d at 125.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 121.
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A. The Facts
The plaintiffs each fall under the classification of English Language
Learners (ELLs), as none of them were native English speakers.116
Furthermore, each of them fell into the subgroup of ELL students
with limited or interrupted formal education.117 The plaintiffs were six
students named Khadidja Issa, Qasin Hassan, Sui Hnem Sung, Van Ni
Lang, Alembe Dunia, and Anyemu Dunia.118 These students ranged
from 18 to 21 years old.119 Under the eligibility rules of Pennsylvania,
all of the plaintiffs were scheduled to age-out of the public school sys-
tem at the age of 21.120 Each of the plaintiffs had been enrolled in
Phoenix Academy.121
The defendant was the School District of Lancaster, which operated
McCaskey High School and Phoenix Academy, a private school under
contract.122 McCaskey contains McCaskey East, which is the Interna-
tional School.123 The International School has a special program for
students who speak little to no English.124 These non-English speaking
students typically attend the International School for one year and
then transition to J.P. McCaskey, the traditional high school.125 The
International School offers two 48-minute ESL classes a day and con-
ducts all content classes using the Sheltered Instruction method.126
Phoenix Academy is a school with an “alternative education pro-
gram” that serves “‘at-risk Students’ over-age for their grade, under-
credited, and in danger of not graduating high school before they age
out of public-school eligibility at 21.”127 The Academy’s mission is
“not to further their academic proficiencies,” but to change the nega-
tive behaviors of the students and help them take enough credits to
graduate.128 When following the curriculum of Phoenix Academy,
116. Id. at 125.
117. Issa, 847 F.3d at 125.
118. Id. at 125–26.
119. Id. at 125. Khadidja Issa was 19 years old, originated from Sudan, and spoke Fur and
Arabic. Id. at 125–26. Hassan was 18 years old, originated from Somalia, and spoke Somali and
Arabic. Id. at 126. Sung, 20, and her sister Lang, 18, both originated from Burma, and spoke
Hakha Chin. Id. Alembe, 21, and his brother Anyemu, 19, originated from Tanzania, and spoke
Swahili and Portuguese. Id.
120. Id. at 141. Issa, Hassan, Lang, and Anyemu all have until 2019 until their eligibility runs
out. Id. at 125–26. Whereas, Alembe and Sung had until 2017. Id. at 126.
121. Id. at 125.
122. Id. at 126.
123. Issa, 847 F.3d at 127.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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these students can graduate in about half the amount of time as a
traditional school’s curriculum.129
The ELL students participate in this accelerated program at Phoe-
nix Academy alongside native English speakers.130 The ELL students’
content classes are not “sheltered,”131 and they have one 80-minute
ESL class a day.132 Furthermore, the Lancaster School District does
not evaluate the efficacy of the ESL Program at Phoenix Academy.133
Typically, students and their families are allowed to choose which of
the schools they would like to attend, McCaskey or Phoenix Acad-
emy.134 However, there is not a choice for “new-to-the-District stu-
dents over age 17 and under-credited,” and these students are
automatically assigned to Phoenix Academy.135 The school district al-
leged it makes this decision “because these students represent a
higher risk of dropping out or aging out at age 21 before earning a
high school diploma.”136 However, the court stated that the school dis-
trict’s funding is based on graduation rates, which are directly affected
when students drop-out or age-out, implying a different reasoning for
automatically enrolling these students in the Phoenix Academy.137
B. Elements of the Preliminary Injunction Claim
The plaintiff-students originally sought a preliminary injunction to
allow “them and similarly situated ELLs to enroll in and attend Mc-
Caskey”138 based on violations of the EEOA § 1703(f), the Four-
teenth Amendment, and state law.139 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction based on the EEOA and state law claims.140
The school district sought appeal to “stay the injunction’s enforce-
ment” based on these claims.141
129. Issa, 847 F.3d at 127.
130. Id.
131. In Sheltered Instruction, “ELLs, including SLIFE, are grouped together in content
courses with other ELLs at comparable English-proficiency levels. ELLs are hence ‘sheltered’ in
those classes from other ELLs at higher proficiency levels and from native English speakers.” Id.
at 127.
132. Id. at 128.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Issa, 847 F.3d at 128.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 129.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Issa, 847 F.3d at 130.
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The Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s ultimate denial of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, reviewed any findings
of fact for clear error, and reviewed any conclusions of law de novo.142
For the court to find an abuse of discretion, the court must have relied
“upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law,
or an improper application of law to fact.”143 Upon review, the court
stated that preliminary injunctions are “granted in limited circum-
stances.”144 The court established the claim under the prongs estab-
lished for a preliminary injunction.145 The court stated, “[t]hose
seeking [a preliminary injunction] must establish that (A) they are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, (B) they are likely to
suffer irreparable harm without relief, (C) the balance of harms favors
them, and (D) relief is in the public interest.”146 The court analyzed
each prong of the preliminary injunction test in turn, which will be
discussed below. Ultimately, the Third Circuit upheld the preliminary
injunction based on the EEOA claims.147
1. Under the First Prong of the Preliminary Injunction Standard the
Plaintiffs Showed a Likelihood of Success Under § 1703(f)
Under this first prong of the preliminary injunction standard, the
court stated that the plaintiff only had to “prove a ‘prima facie case,’
not a ‘certainty’ she’ll win”148 and only had to show a “‘reasonable
probability’ of success.”149 The court used an elemental test for a
§ 1703(f) complaint and analyzed the probability of success under
those elements, while also relying on the standard outlined in the
Castaneda decision for guidance.150
This was the first time the Third Circuit addressed a claim under
§ 1703(f) of the EEOA.151 In its analysis, the court referenced the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court and other United States Courts of Ap-
peals.152 The court first looked at the language of the statute and
previous decisions to determine that to allege a violation of § 1703(f),
142. Id. at 131.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
2014)).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Ferring Pharms., 765 F.3d at 210).
147. Issa, 847 F.3d at 125.
148. Id. at 131 (quoting Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir.
2001)).
149. Id. (quoting Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 1980)).
150. Id. at 129–32.
151. Id. at 131.
152. See id. at 131–40.
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an individual must satisfy four elements.153 The court held that the
plaintiff proved the first and second elements of the EEOA claim.154
The school district was clearly an “educational agency,” and the de-
fendant did not argue otherwise, thereby satisfying the first ele-
ment.155 The court likewise determined there was no “genuine
dispute” over the second element.156 The court reasoned that the re-
cord was full of evidence to show that “all SLIFE, face[d] formidable
language barriers.”157 Included in the analysis of the second factor was
the fact that all the plaintiffs testified, through interpreters, that they
could not understand what was being taught to them in the classes at
Phoenix Academy.158 Therefore, the court held that this evidence was
proof that the language barrier impeded the plaintiffs’ equal
participation.159
The court then moved on to discuss the third element of § 1703(f),
whether the defendant failed to take “appropriate action.”160 The
court stated that to satisfy this element, evidence must be presented to
show a “reasonable probability” that appropriate action was not
taken.161 As has been previously done by other courts, the Third Cir-
cuit looked to other decisions for guidance on the meaning of “appro-
priate action” because the EEOA does not provide an adequate
definition.162 The court assessed the Supreme Court’s decision in Lau
v. Nichols and noted that when enacting § 1703(f), Congress “em-
braced Lau’s ‘essential holding’ that ‘schools are not free to ignore the
need of limited English speaking children for language assistance.’”163
The court then analyzed the reasoning and holding of the Fifth Cir-
cuit case, Castaneda v. Pickard.164 The court stated that Congress had
given state and local authorities leeway “to choose the ‘programs and
techniques they would use’ to satisfy § 1703(f)’s mandate.”165 But also
noted that giving these authorities too much latitude would make
§ 1703(f) irrelevant.166 Accordingly, under Castaneda the educational
153. See supra text accompanying note 62; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012). R
154. Issa, 847 F.3d at 132.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 132.
159. Id.
160. Issa, 847 F.3d at 132.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 132–33.
163. Id. at 133 (quoting Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008 (5th Cir. 1981)).
164. Id. at 134.
165. Id. at 133 (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009).
166. Issa, 847 F.3d at 133.
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agency “must make a ‘genuine and good faith effort’” to remedy the
problems of their students.167 The court in Issa used this test to “prop-
erly balance[ ] § 1703(f)’s ‘allocation of responsibilities between the
courts and the schools.’”168 In accordance with this test, the court first
analyzed the evidence of the soundness of the theory or principle by
determining whether the district’s program was “informed by an edu-
cational theory recognized as sound by some experts in the field.”169
Second, the court determined whether the actual program that the
school district used sufficiently implemented the proposed theory.170
The third consideration was whether the program actually produced
results that overcame the language barriers.171 The court found that
under this three-prong test, the defendant failed to meet the first and
third prongs.172
Under Castaneda’s first prong, the plaintiffs showed they would
likely succeed in regard to the appropriate action requirement under
§ 1703(f), as they provided expert testimony that showed Phoenix’s
ELL program was inadequate for SLIFE.173 The expert testified that
SLIFE, generally, need to be taught slower and it is important to
“build the literacy.”174 Therefore, the accelerated program at Phoenix
was “totally inappropriate,” and “[n]o evidence was presented that an
accelerated curriculum, on its own, is accepted as sound educational
theory for SLIFE.”175 Furthermore, the expert stated that her opinion
had the support of others in the field and that sheltered instruction
was appropriate for the needs of SLIFE.176 The school district tried to
counter this evidence by impeaching the expert, but the court did not
accept the defendant’s argument.177 The Third Circuit agreed with the
district court and held that the “plaintiffs showed a reasonable
probability” that the program at Phoenix was not “informed by an
167. Id. (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 992).
168. Id. at 134 (quoting Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987)).
169. Id. (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009).
170. Id. (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010).
171. Id. at 134 (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010).
172. Issa, 847 F.3d at 134.
173. Id. at 135.
174. Id. (“SLIFE, Dr. Marshall emphasized, generally struggle or have yet to learn to read or
write in any language, including their native languages. Not only must they learn English in
American schools, she explained, they must learn how to learn there. . . . Dr. Marshall said that
for SLIFE to succeed, teaching must ‘go more slowly and build, build the language, build the
literacy,’ and ‘fill in the gaps.’ . . . This testimony went unchallenged.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 136.
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educational theory recognized as sound by some experts in the
field.”178
The court determined that Castaneda’s third prong also showed the
inadequacy of the defendant to provide “appropriate action,” as there
was no record or data to show that the ESL program at Phoenix was
working effectively.179 The school district did not retain any data on
the effectiveness of the ESL program at Phoenix.180 The school dis-
trict tried to prove the program’s effectiveness by demonstrating that
Anyemu could successfully read an essay in English aloud on the re-
cord, but the court stated that, “his ability to read a portion of an
essay in court says nothing about whether the other four named plain-
tiffs were overcoming their own language barriers at Phoenix.”181 In
fact, the record was replete with evidence that the Phoenix Program
was not in fact overcoming their language barriers.182 The school dis-
trict also tried to argue, to no avail, that the student’s ability to gradu-
ate aids the school district’s argument that they took “appropriate
action” under § 1703(f).183 Considering the arguments, the court
found that the plaintiffs “showed a likelihood that Phoenix’s program
fails to produce results indicating that their language barriers are actu-
ally being overcome.”184
Finally, the Third Circuit went on to discuss the fourth element of
§ 1703(f), whether “the plaintiffs were denied equal educational op-
portunity on account of their race, color, sex, or national origin.”185
The defendant argued this element should be interpreted to mean that
there must be “a showing of intentional discrimination” and that there
was not enough evidence to prove the placement of the plaintiffs at
the ESL Program at Phoenix was motivated by their national ori-
gins.186 The court rejected this interpretation, instead reasoning that
the language of § 1703(f) requires “a showing of discrimination of any
kind, intentional or otherwise, on account of an EEOA-protected
characteristic.”187 The court referenced the reasoning of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which provided an argument that in § 1703(d) of the EEOA Con-
gress used the word “discrimination,” whereas it did not in
178. Issa, 847 F.3d at 136–37.
179. Id. at 137.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 137.
184. Issa, 847 F.3d at 138.
185. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012)).
186. Id. at 139.
187. Id.
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§ 1703(f).188 Therefore, the Third Circuit determined that this inten-
tional exclusion of the term, “discrimination,” meant there was no re-
quirement to prove it.189 Simply put, the plaintiffs had to prove “a
nexus between the lost educational opportunity alleged and an
EEOA-protected characteristic.”190 The court held that the plaintiff
satisfied the fourth element under § 1703(f) because “the record fully
supports that the plaintiffs’ language barriers, and hence their lost ed-
ucational opportunities, stem from their national origin.”191
After considering all four factors needed for a claim under
§ 1703(f), the court determined that the plaintiff adequately proved a
likelihood of success under the § 1703(f) claim.192
2. The Remaining Prongs of the Preliminary Injunction Standard
The court held the preliminary injunction claim could continue
based on the EEOA § 1703(f) complaint and continued its analysis of
the other elements of the preliminary injunction based on that
claim.193
Under the second element of a preliminary injunction, the court
held that it was likely the students would suffer irreparable harm if
they were required to stay at Phoenix Academy.194 The court stressed
the importance of an education for a child, stating that “even a ‘few
months’ in an unsound program can make a ‘world of difference in
harm’ to a child’s educational development.”195 The court found that
the plaintiffs proved that without the injunction there was a likelihood
of irreparable harm.196
Under the third element for demonstrating the need for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the court held that “the balance of harms favor[ed]
the plaintiffs.”197 The defendants argued that the injunction infringes
on their authority to make such decisions, but the court did not give
weight to this argument.198 The court reasoned that “[u]nder the
EEOA, we reject an educational agency’s call for unfettered decision-
188. Id.; see also Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007–08 (5th Cir. 1981).
189. Issa, 847 F.3d at 139.
190. Id. at 140.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 142.
194. Id.
195. Issa, 847 F.3d at 142.
196. Id. at 143.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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making authority when its programs fall short of § 1703(f)’s
mandate.”199
The court analyzed the final element of a preliminary injunction
and determined that normally when likelihood of success on the mer-
its and irreparable injury are proven, then “it ‘almost always will be
the case’ that the public interest favors preliminary relief.”200 These
three elements had much less analysis by the court. However, the
court affirmed the preliminary injunction.201
3. The Court’s Conclusion
The court affirmed the preliminary injunction order on the EEOA
violation.202 It determined that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of
success on the EEOA claim.203 The court held that there was no abuse
of discretion when the district court granted the preliminary injunc-
tion because the plaintiffs were “likely to suffer irreparable harm
without relief, the balance of harms favors them, and relief is in the
public interest.”204
IV. ANALYSIS
Many may believe that the Issa decision is a simple application of
previously developed standards. However, this application is not insig-
nificant as it provided protection for Khadidja, Qasin, Sui hnem Sung,
Van Ni Lang, Alembe, and Anyemu, and it accomplished the goal of
§ 1703(f) by applying it consistently with the intentions of the legisla-
ture, thus providing a guideline for future courts.
In this Section, the decision of the court will be dissected and com-
pared to the decisions of other jurisdictions. Subsection A will analyze
each element of the Third Circuit’s test and compare the test to those
of other Circuits. Specifically, this analysis will discuss the importance
of the first and second elements in regard to setting up the framework.
It will also analyze the “appropriate action” element and the Third
Circuit’s use of decisions of other jurisdictions. Furthermore, an analy-
sis of the fourth element will discuss the nexus between the “appropri-
ate action” and the protected class. Ultimately, the Third Circuit
deftly navigated the existing caselaw on EEOA claims, created an in-
199. Id. at 143 (citing Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987)).
200. Id. (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421,
1427 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)).
201. Issa, 847 F.3d at 144.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 143–44.
204. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 25 29-MAY-19 16:58
2019] REDEFINING HOW TO SPEAK “AMERICAN” 659
fluential elemental test, and protected the students from
discrimination.
A. The Elemental Test Created by the Third Circuit
While courts have analyzed a § 1703(f) complaint before,205 the
Third Circuit had not, and it took the opportunity in Issa to create an
elemental test that clearly defines the requirements to prove a viola-
tion of § 1703(f).206 The Third Circuit paid special attention to the
statutory language of § 1703(f).207 The analysis provided by the court
in Issa maintains the integrity of the language of § 1703(f) while utiliz-
ing prior standards established in prior decisions, especially that of
Fifth Circuit.208
While courts in the past focused on analyzing whether there was
“appropriate action” taken, the Third Circuit took the opportunity to
build upon the previous standards and thoroughly outline the require-
ments of a § 1703(f) complaint. The language of the test established in
Issa provides that:
(1) [T]he defendant must be an educational agency, (2) the plaintiff
must face language barriers impeding her equal participation in the
defendant’s instructional programs, (3) the defendant must have
failed to take appropriate action to overcome those barriers, and (4)
the plaintiff must have been denied equal educational opportunity
on account of her race, color, sex, or national origin.209
This framework gives courts the opportunity to evaluate § 1703(f)
complaints on a step-by-step basis, instead of focusing on one vague
provision of the statute.210
205. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1007–10 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. See Issa, 847 F.3d at 131–32.
207. See id. at 132 n.6 (stating that the three-prong test used by the district court “ignor[ed]
§ 1703(f)’s ‘educational agency’ and ‘on account of’ language”); see also Issa v. Sch. Dist., No. 16-
3881, 2016 WL 4493202, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d and remanded by 847 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 888 F. Supp. 2d 534, 575 (M.D. Pa. 2012)) (stating that the
test to prevail on a § 1703(f) claim requires a showing of, “(1) language barriers; (2) defendant’s
failure to take appropriate action to overcome these barriers; and (3) a resulting impediment to
students’ equal participation in instructional programs”).
208. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012) which states:
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or
her race, color, sex, or national origin, by—
. . .
(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome lan-
guage barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional
programs.
209. Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2017).
210. See generally Castaneda, 648 F.2d 989.
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The district court relied on a different elemental test, which stated
that to prevail on a § 1703(f) claim, the plaintiff must prove “(1) lan-
guage barriers; (2) defendant’s failure to take appropriate action to
overcome these barriers; and (3) a resulting impediment to students’
equal participation in instructional programs.”211 The Third Circuit re-
jected the use of this elemental test, as it ignored some of the language
of §1703(f), specifically § 1703(f) used the language “educational
agency” and “on account of.”212 The Third Circuit’s elemental test is a
more accurate use of the language of § 1703(f), as the four elements of
the test incorporate the requirements of § 1703(f).213 The Third Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of § 1703(f) of the EEOA follows with a “basic
interpretive canon” that each provision of a statute should be given its
due effect when construing a statute.214 The previous test cited by the
district court rendered the language of the statute insignificant, as it
was not included in the test.215 The Third Circuit correctly relied on
this canon to give effect to its four-element test.
The Third Circuit created an elemental test that captures the lan-
guage of § 1703(f) and outlines a complaint on a step-by-step basis.
Under this framework, the Third Circuit correctly decided in favor of
the plaintiffs.
1. The First and Second Elements of the Test: Beginning the
Framework
Even though the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs had satisfied
the first and second elements of a § 1703(f) complaint without much
discussion, the court still set a framework for others to follow.216 The
school district clearly met the definition of an “educational agency”
under both § 1703(f) and § 1720(a) and the court held as such.217 As
for the second element, the court relied on the overwhelming evi-
dence that the plaintiffs faced formidable language barriers, which set
the tone for the decision in recognizing that the plaintiffs had faced
211. Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *5 (quoting CG, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 575).
212. See Issa, 847 F.3d at 132 n.6 (acknowledging that the Third Circuit had previously af-
firmed the decision of CG v. Pennsylvania Department of Education but did not reach the
EEOA claims in the decision, so Issa is still an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit); see
also supra note 55 and accompanying text. R
213. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f).
214. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
215. See Issa, 847 F.3d at 132 n.6.
216. Id. at 132 (holding that there was no genuine dispute over the first and second factors of
the four-part elemental test created by the court).
217. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f); 20 U.S.C. § 1720(a) (2012) (“The term ‘educational agency’
means a local educational agency or a ‘State educational agency’ as defined by section 801(k) of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.”).
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inequality.218 Even though there will always be a focus on the “appro-
priate action” language of § 1703(f), all elements of § 1703(f) should
be addressed.219 Although neither of these first two elements is diffi-
cult to interpret on the facts of the Issa decision, the decision creates a
roadmap for future courts.
2. The Third Element: “Appropriate Action” and Integration of
Persuasive Decisions
Under the third element of a § 1703(f) complaint, the court in Issa
required showing a lack of “appropriate action” to overcome the lan-
guage barrier by the defendant.220 The analysis of an “appropriate ac-
tion” is one that has eluded the courts for many years. It was
ultimately up to the judicial system to expand on what constituted an
“appropriate action” for educational agencies to take under
§ 1703(f).221 While there was no guidance from the EEOA itself, the
courts have continually built upon other decisions to begin building a
framework for complaints of this nature.222 There may be multiple ap-
proaches to providing SLIFE with the adequate and appropriate edu-
cation they deserve, but in reality the judiciary has an important role
in monitoring these actions in regard to § 1703(f). The decision in Issa
created a new standard of elements to follow for these complaints and
also expanded upon the “appropriate action” requirement by helping
to create an ascertainable standard.
Many argue that the EEOA does not provide enough guidance in
regard to how much action an educational agency should take.223 An-
other critique is that the judicial system is not the best means of deter-
mining the factors of the EEOA.224 While this may be true, the
judiciary has given non-native English-speaking students some protec-
218. Issa, 847 F.3d at 132.
219. See generally Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981) (creating the three-prong
test to determine if appropriate action has been taken).
220. Issa, 847 F.3d at 132.
221. Id. at 133 (“Without guidance from Congress on what ‘appropriate action’ looks like,
however, the Fifth Circuit found itself, like we are now, confronted with a type of task which
federal courts are ill-equipped to perform and which we are often criticized for undertaking—
prescribing substantive standards and policies for institutions whose governance is properly re-
served to other levels and branches of our government (i.e., state and local educational agencies)
which are better able to assimilate and assess the knowledge of professionals in the field.”).
222. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Castaneda, 648 F.2d 989.
223. Berenyi, supra note 64, at 667–69. R
224. Id.; see also Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Be-
cause of the nature of the judicial process, federal courts are poorly equipped to set substantive
standards for institutions whose control is properly reserved to other branches and levels of
government better able to assess and apply the knowledge of professionals in a given field (here
elementary and secondary education).”).
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tion that has not been provided through other means. The courts have
noted that it is important to provide equal educational opportunities
to students and guidance to educational agencies, while providing ed-
ucational agencies autonomy.225 The ambiguity of the EEOA was in-
tended to allow the educational agencies to determine what methods
are appropriate for their students.226 This may have led to a discrep-
ancy in the court, but as provided in Issa there is some uniformity for
how to approach these complaints.227 In the absence of a reform to
the EEOA, the judicial precedence included in Issa provides the pro-
tection needed for students such as these.
By analyzing the Lau decision, the Issa court reinforced the under-
standing of § 1703(f) in regard to “appropriate action” that “schools
are not free to ignore the need of limited English speaking children
for language assistance.”228 Lau predated the enactment of
§ 1703(f),229 but it is still relevant to the decisions of courts today. This
discussion of Lau incorporated the meaning behind the language of
§ 1703(f) and “articulated the need to focus on providing students
with a meaningful education regardless of their initial language
abilities.”230
The incorporation of the Castaneda decision was integral to the test
established by Issa. Castaneda created a three-prong test for determin-
ing whether an educational agency violated § 1703(f).231 Castaneda
provided guidelines for “appropriate action,” but did “not explicitly
define what would constitute acceptable achievement results.”232 Each
of the three prongs of the Castaneda test was analyzed in Issa. The
Issa court correctly applied these three prongs to conclude that defen-
dant had not taken appropriate action under § 1703(f). The thorough
analysis by the Issa court of the first and third prongs provides a struc-
ture for the analysis of “appropriate action.” However, the Third Cir-
cuit was right to “decline to adopt ‘without qualification’ Castaneda’s
framework and think ‘fine tuning must await future cases.’”233 The
court was further correct in stating that the test, “as a general matter,
225. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1011.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65. R
227. Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2017).
228. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1008 (stating that this is the “essential holding” of Lau); see also
Issa, 847 F.3d at 133.
229. Issa, 847 F.3d at 132.
230. Jeffrey Mongiello, The Future of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act § 1703(f) After
Horne v. Flores: Using No Child Left Behind Proficiency Levels to Define Appropriate Action
Towards Meaningful Educational Opportunity, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 211, 217 (2011).
231. Id. at 219.
232. Id. at 220.
233. Issa, 847 F.3d at 134.
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properly balances § 1703(f)’s ‘allocation of responsibilities between
the courts and the schools,’” and using it as a “starting point” for its
analysis. This test, while influential and important in the analysis of
Issa, could be improved upon in future situations as more § 1703(f)
complaints arise. Some argue the test fails to fully assess situations
and can only be used once litigation has started, but the Issa court did
apply it in the appropriate situation.234
The court in Issa did state that the Castaneda approach “properly
balances § 1703(f)’s ‘allocation of responsibilities between the court
and the schools’ and hence provides a ‘fruitful starting point’ for our
analysis under § 1703(f)’s third element.”235 While the Third Circuit
does not definitively state that the Castaneda approach should be the
approach to all situations where “appropriate action” is to be deter-
mined, its analysis stays true to previous discussion by courts and pro-
vides a complete understanding of “appropriate action.”
3. The Fourth Element: The Nexus
While seemingly simple, the fourth element may be difficult for fu-
ture courts to analyze. The defendant in Issa argued that the language
of the EEOA requiring that the failure to take appropriate action was
“on account of” the national origin of the plaintiffs requires a “show-
ing of intentional discrimination.”236 However, the court correctly re-
jected this reading of § 1703(f). Congress did not use the word
“discrimination” in § 1703(f), while it did in other sections of this
same statute.237 It seems that the court in Issa was following the inter-
pretive canon, aptly titled the Whole Statute Interpretation or Whole
Act Rule.238 Under this canon, “[a] statute is passed as a whole and
not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and
intent.”239 While the Whole Act Rule may seem simple in its theory,
the application is more intricate. Accordingly, “[a] statutory subsec-
tion may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in
reference to the statute as a whole . . . .”240 The Whole Act Rule in
application supports an analysis of other clauses in the statute to inter-
234. Berenyi, supra note 64, at 661. R
235. Issa, 847 F.3d at 134 (quoting Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
236. Id. at 139.
237. Id. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012) with § 1703(d) and § 1703(e) (showing that both
§§ 1703(d)–(e) include the word “discrimination,” while § 1703(f) does not).
238. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:5 (7th ed.), Westlaw (database up-
dated May 2018).
239. Id.
240. Id.
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pret a meaning of the specific provision of the statute.241 Therefore,
when the court compared the use of “discrimination” in other sections
of the statute to § 1703(f) and determined that there was no require-
ment to show intentional discrimination it was following basic estab-
lished rules of statutory interpretation.
Furthermore, the court also pointed out that there was a lack of
“language connoting intentional conduct” in § 1703(f), whereas in
other subsections of the Act Congress “required showings of ‘deliber-
ate’ and ‘purpose[ful]’ conduct.”242 This shows that no intentional
conduct is needed to show that the action was taken “on account of”
the national origins of the plaintiffs.243 Once again, this analysis is in
line with the essential holding of Lau and other prior decisions. Hold-
ing that there must be a nexus between the failure to take “appropri-
ate action” and a protected classification, in the EEOA closely follows
the language of the EEOA. This holding does not impress a require-
ment on the plaintiff that is not already required by the language of
the statute.244
B. The Third Circuit’s Appropriate Approach
The Third Circuit in Issa approached a novel problem by appropri-
ately incorporating caselaw and creating an elemental test for a
§ 1703(f) complaint. Although a seemingly simple decision, the Third
Circuit approached this issue in a structured and well-reasoned man-
ner. The framework created by the court stays true to the language of
§ 1703(f), and under this test the Third Circuit applied the appropriate
caselaw to reach a sound decision. Ultimately, this decision provided
the protection that was intended245 under § 1703(f) for students facing
a denial of their educational opportunities.
V. IMPACT
Issa created an elemental test for a § 1703(f) violation that will be
vital in future decisions and for the protection of other students. Part
A of this section will discuss the applicability of this elemental test as
evidenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District
241. Id.
242. Issa v. Sch. Dist., 847 F.3d 121, 139 (3d Cir. 2017).
243. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION, supra note 238, at § 46:5. R
244. See Issa, 847 F.3d at 139.
245. See infra Part I.B (stating that the essential holding of Lau was codified in the EEOA,
which was “that all students must have adequate access to English-language instruction”).
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of Florida decision of Methelus v. School Board.246 Part B of this sec-
tion discusses the practical impact that this decision could have in pro-
viding greater protections for students who experience discrimination
on a daily basis.
A. Methelus v. School Board
Methelus, decided on March 17, 2017, involved a similar factual situ-
ation and used the Issa decision’s interpretation of the language of
§ 1703(f) and “appropriate action” as persuasive authority.247 Because
there is not much precedent on this issue, Issa provides guidance not
only in its own jurisdiction but elsewhere, as demonstrated in Methe-
lus v. School Board.248
The plaintiffs were “the parents and guardians of foreign-born, En-
glish Language Learner (‘ELL’) children . . . who were allegedly de-
nied access to a free public education.”249 The stories of each plaintiff
are similar; they traveled from either Haiti or Guatemala and at-
tempted to enroll in Collier County high schools for the 2015–2016
school year. The plaintiffs’ ages ranged from 15–17.250 None of the
plaintiffs were accepted in the Collier County High schools and “none
of [the] Plaintiff Children were assessed for English language profi-
ciency or academic achievement before being denied enrollment.”251
The policy of the district was to exclude students over the age of 19
and students over the age of 17 who could not graduate by the age of
19.252 The defendants relied on this policy, stating they had the au-
thority to make such a policy according to their “home-rule power”253
that originated from the Florida Constitution and education law and
excluded the plaintiffs under this policy.254 The defendants claimed
that no federal or state law imposed “age and academic prerequisites
246. Methelus v. Sch. Bd., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1266 (M.D. Fla. 2017).
247. Id. at 1266.
248. See id. at 1275.
249. Id. at 1269.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Methelus, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1272.
253. Generally, home rule is “[a] state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of
autonomy to a local government, conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.” Home Rule,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d pocket ed. 2006). Specifically, the defendant argued that under
“Florida’s Constitution and education law . . . ‘school boards shall operate, control, and super-
vise all free public schools within their school districts and may exercise any power except as
expressly prohibited by the State Constitution or general law.’” Methelus, 243 F. Supp. 3d at
1272 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1001.32(2) (West 2018)).
254. Methelus, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1272.
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for free public education.”255 The plaintiffs claimed that this policy
“contravenes the EEOA, Title VI, Fourteenth Amendment, and
FEEA.”256 The court did not accept the defendants’ reliance on their
home rule power, stating that, “the home-rule power does not per se
mean that Policy 5112.01 can escape aligning with applicable federal
and state law.”257 Essentially, the court stated that the home-rule
power was “not limitless” and many laws, including the EEOA, do
limit it.258 The court stated that the school district could not rely on
this policy for those plaintiffs 16 and under.259 As for the plaintiffs
who were 17, the age-limit policy did apply but the defendants did not
follow it when denying the enrollment.260 The policy required that the
students be “afforded an opportunity to pursue a high school diploma
through the Adult High School or General Educational Development
(GED) programs of the District,” and the evidence provided shows
that the students were not provided that opportunity.261 Therefore,
because the EEOA limits the power and the defendants did not ade-
quately follow the policy, the reliance on the policy and “home-rule
power to dismiss this case falls short.”262
The defendants filed for a motion to dismiss under multiple counts,
but specifically under the EEOA complaint.263 The court cited to
the elemental test established by Issa.264 There was no dispute that
the plaintiffs sufficiently pled the first and second elements, but the
third and fourth elements had to be analyzed.265
When analyzing the third element and whether the defendants took
appropriate action, the district court found the Issa decision “illustra-
tive.”266 The district court then stated a similar history of the “appro-
priate action” analysis, starting with the standard originally stated in
Lau v. Nichols. The court reiterated that § 1703(f) incorporated the
main holding of Lau. Then the district court stated the reasoning in
Castaneda and outlined the three-prong test.267 In its analysis, the dis-
trict court emphasized the concern of the Issa court, that even though
255. Id. at 1272–73.
256. Id. at 1273.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1274.
259. Id.
260. Methelus, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1274.
261. Id. at 1272–73.
262. Id. at 1273.
263. Id. at 1274.
264. Id. at 1275; see also supra text accompanying note 62. R
265. Id.
266. Methelus, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.
267. Id. at 1276.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 33 29-MAY-19 16:58
2019] REDEFINING HOW TO SPEAK “AMERICAN” 667
§ 1703(f) allows state and local authorities latitude in their decisions
to meet the “appropriate action” requirement, allowing “too much
latitude . . . would render § 1703(f) a nullity.”268 However, the court
did not analyze under the three prongs because the court character-
ized exclusion of the plaintiffs as “no action,” which obviously did not
meet the “appropriate action” requirement.269 In this case, the “De-
fendants’ refusal to enroll Plaintiff Children in public school, referral
to noncredit Adult ESOL programs, failure to assess their English and
academic proficiency, and otherwise failure to follow the District ELL
Plan” constituted a failure to meet the appropriate action require-
ment.270 Under this analysis, the court denied the defendants’ motion
to dismiss based on the EEOA complaint.271
Issa’s influence was integral to the Methelus analysis of the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss in regard to “appropriate action.” The impact
of a case originally in Pennsylvania on a decision in Florida shows the
universality of the standard that Issa created for a § 1703(f) claim. By
creating the four-element standard for a § 1703(f) complaint, the Issa
court gave a standard for other courts to follow. The Issa analysis of
the degree of latitude given to the state and local authorities has made
an ambiguous standard more attainable.
B. The Practical Impact
The implication of Issa is that it finally provided the protection due
to Khadidja, Qasin, Sui hnem Sung, Van Ni Lang, Alembe, Anyemu,
and other students in the district who would potentially face the same
issue. This direct impact is something many lose sight of in the intrica-
cies of a § 1703(f) assessment.
The history of inequality based on national origin in connection
with native language has led to this decision in Issa. As described
above,272 many sectors of our society perpetuate discrimination based
on native language, parallel to that faced by Khadidja, Qasin, Sui
hnem Sung, Van Ni Lang, Alembe, and Anyemu in Issa. This discrimi-
nation is not one that is “new” or “unique,” but is faced by many
nationwide in various settings, including in the education, workplace,
the voting process, and jury selection. While native language is not
provided the same formal protection as other forms of discrimination,
it is just as prominent and deserves a serious discussion. Discrimina-
268. Id. at 1275 (quoting Issa, 847 F.3d at 133).
269. Id. at 1276.
270. Id. at 1277.
271. Id.
272. See supra Part II.A.
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tion of this type is anchored in national origin, and it is vital to protect
those who face these hurdles on a daily basis. Although the decision in
Issa focused on the discrimination faced by non-native English speak-
ers in education, the underlying protection afforded to these students
in this decision is something that should be provided to every citizen.
The same effort made in regard to education should be made regard-
ing other areas of our society. The relevance of a decision that pro-
vides adequate protection should not be lost in the fight for equality.
Furthermore, even though native language is not a protected classi-
fication under the EEOA, there has been protection of the rights of
students who are denied proper education based on their English lan-
guage deficiency when connected to their national origin.273 Issa fol-
lowed the reasoning of prior decisions to protect the rights of these
refugee children whose difficulties resembled those faced by other
non-native English speaking students in our country. The test used by
the Issa court provides the SLIFE/ELL students with the protection
they deserve, just as other decisions in the past have tried to do. Issa
provides a measurement for the methods that educational agencies
use that are intended to aid SLIFE students in their education by de-
termining whether appropriate action is being taken. Analysis of the
methods for aiding SLIFE in a uniform manner provided by Issa is
imperative because otherwise there is a reality that educational agen-
cies will be giving a second-class education to non-native English
speakers.
The protection provided by Issa is not insignificant in a society that
has enabled this type of discrimination.274 Each student should have
access to an equal education, as provided for in the EEOA, and this
decision is one step in further achieving this equality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has a long history of discriminating against those
who do not speak the English language,275 but the interpretation of
§ 1703(f) in connection with national origin makes it clear that this
type of discrimination will not be allowed in education. At first glance,
the Issa decision is just another case decided on § 1703(f) of the
EEOA, but in reality, the court deftly navigated the existing caselaw
in analyzing the situation that Khadidja, Qasin, Sui hnem Sung, Van
Ni Lang, Alembe, and Anyemu faced. Ultimately, Issa created an ele-
273. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974).
274. See supra Part II.A.
275. See supra Part II.A.
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mental test that will become applicable in other courts, just as we have
seen in Methelus, while providing protection for students who are un-
fairly facing discrimination. EEOA § 1703(f) aims to provide equal
education for all students regardless of language barriers, and Issa
may be the next step in achieving this equality.
Abigail Flores
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